

Role Of External Actor Involvement In Somalia Peace Building Processes

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Abstract: External actor involvement in peace building processes has historically been global. In contemporary times, this has happened in Europe namely in Kosovo, Bosnia and Yugoslavia. It has also happened in Asia, Latin America and Africa. In Africa, such cases were witnessed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Somalia. Somalia has experienced one of the longest civil wars attributed to the collapse of the state in 1991 which resulted into the destruction of social fabrics and institutions necessary for governance making Somalia the most insecure and chaotic country in the world. In spite of its homogeneity of using the same language and adhering to the same religion, Somalia has remained an area with widespread lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and human rights abuses topping the list of failed states index in the world. The study investigated the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia. It explored to find out whether external actor involvement in peace building have been successful or not and the challenges facing it. The general objective was to evaluate the external actor involvement including state and non-state actors influencing peace building processes in Somalia. The study specifically undertook to explore the nature, assess the role and examine the challenges facing external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes. This study was anchored within the power relations theoretical framework which brought out the different perspectives in state behaviour and interactions in the international system. It utilized a conceptual framework in analyzing power relations in external actor involvement in Somalia with emphasis on AMISOM, IGAD, Kenya and Ethiopia. The study was mainly conducted in Gedo area in the Southern parts of Somalia that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia and employed the questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion and semi-structured interview methods of data collection. The study was justified due to the fact that Somalia conflict has had major implications to global terrorism and regional insecurity affecting Kenya and Ethiopia directly as frontline states. In the conceptual framework, the study borrowed key tenets from the theory of realism and the neo functionalism theory. The study utilized the explanatory research design to obtain information concerning the current status of external actor involvement in peace building processes in Somalia. It used the purposive, stratified and snowball sampling techniques. A total of 392 people out of targeted 425 population participated in different ways in the information gathering processes for the study. The findings were presented descriptively. Ethically, the questions were framed in consideration of the willingness of respondents with regard to sensitivities associated with the conflicts and terrorist groups that have exploited the Somalia peace buildings. The study found out that the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia are either military or civilian with uncoordinated and shared mandates. Their activities are ineffective because they are reconstruction oriented rather than recovery. This study has identified and addressed these gaps by way of recommendations to policy makers and scholars. The study recommends adoption of a lead agency in an integrated peace mission and multidimensional mission planning approach that would incorporate all the different actors characterizing the Somalia peace building context. This would ensure effective planning, coordination and execution processes by different external actors interested in addressing the interdependence.

Keywords: External Actor Involvement, AMISOM, IGAD, contemporary times.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study:

Somalia conflict has had major implications on Kenya's security given that the two countries share a long and porous border. Owing to cultural links, the Somalia people are found in both countries and often exchange visits on either side. The problems created by the long Somali conflict are many and have not been confined to Somalia alone, but have had spill over effects to the neighbours. There is no doubt therefore, that the Somali conflict impacts heavily on Kenya's national interests, hence the need for this study. The effects of the Somali problems are felt in Kenya because of the common border, which divides the Somali people into four different nationalities of Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The Colonial powers arbitrarily drew the colonial frontiers without regard to the ethnic group's interests dividing their culture or the economic potential. In essence the boundaries were artificial and very often have caused inter-state conflicts especially in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, which has been the most affected, is centre to many disputes in the region. It continues to experience civil wars, which are clan-based and these often impact negatively against Kenya's national security [20].

Somalia is universally pictured as a country synonymous with terrorism, clannish, conflict, civil war, violence, warlords, famine, jihad, piracy and underdevelopment. The country has been engulfed in violent conflict for more than two decades. The immediate cause of the Somali conflict relates to power competition in the post-colonial government. In 1960, Somalia held successful presidential elections in which Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was elected President. In 1967, Abdirshid Ali Sharma'arke was voted in as President in elections which were also generally peaceful. However, the regime of President Sharma'arke was characterized by political instability which led to his assassination and a subsequent military coup by Mohamed Siad Bare. President Bare's regime was also characterized by an oppressive dictatorial rule, wars and a weakening economy. His military regime lasted until 1991 when he was toppled during an outbreak of civil war [21]. This marked the collapse of the Somali state with cessation of government services and a long catalogue of chaos and human suffering [22]. The ensuing intolerable humanitarian conditions included famine, disease, and endless civil wars.

According to [23] and [24], the collapse of the Somalia state triggered a massive exodus of Somalis into the Diaspora. Humanitarian crises followed with the USA and UN intervening, albeit unsuccessfully between 1992 and 1995. This heralded the start of Somalia's diplomatic and economic isolation. The international relief and security operation that followed brought help to needy populations, but failed to bring to an end the inter-clan wars and militia conflicts which continued. Poverty reinforced by major droughts and famine ensued, further deepening the impact of war and displacement of thousands of civilians.

However, after over two decades of war and more than fifteen peace conferences to resolve this conflict, Somalia has a weak federal government based in Mogadishu with little control and influence in the other parts of the country. There are also over 22,000 African troops in the country mandated by the UNSC and African Union (AU) to support Somalia's government fighting Al-shabaab (A terrorist Al-Qaeda affiliated organization). These troops also help the Somali government to build the Somali security forces to take over the security in the country. A UN assistance mission in the country known as UNSOM is also operating to facilitate and organize humanitarian and other strategic policy advice to the Somali government in peace and reconciliation process.

Despite failure to establish a Somali central state in over two decades, parts of the country made significant progress in terms of security, reconciliation and peace building. The southern regions of Somalia that include Gedo area that borders Kenya and Ethiopia and the Northern parts of Somali regions formerly the British Somaliland, have made substantial progress towards peace and governance [13]. Locals in those regions formed the "Somaliland", administration, a secessionist self-declared state. Likewise, the North-eastern regions of the country made a successive reconciliation in those regions and formed the "Puntland" regional autonomy of Somalia [23].

The international conflict management system [UN] established shortly after the Second World War in 1945 has proved remarkably durable in the face of deep and challenging global conflicts. A number of conflicts have been resolved through UN interventions while some has remained protracted- as the case of Somalia which has now witnessed a decade of conflicts despite UN and AU interventions. [21] contend that the international and regional external actor involvement

in resolving the Somalia conflicts failed due to poor strategies employed and Somalia has remained a battlefield despite physical intervention by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. According to [2], the United Nations, African Union through AMISOM as non-state actors, the Federal Government of Somalia and other external state actors are now making progress in stabilizing Somalia. A variety of legal, administrative and diplomatic mechanisms are involved in conflict management and the relationships and interactions between the mechanisms themselves create multiple avenues of engagement as evidenced in Somalia since 1991. This study, therefore, seeks to examine the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes.

1.2 Statement of the Problem :

Civil war is one of the manmade disasters that causes the death and loss of many lives. After the end of the cold war it is observed that major wars became less while regional and domestic conflicts between nations still exist and leads to the pressure of outside states and external institutions to intervene. In today's world many countries are going through civil war with different intentions including different political views and religious beliefs. In some parts of the world these civil wars are expanding and initiating the network of terrorism. As a result terrorism and national security became two of the main issues being prioritized by most of the nation states across the globe. To stop these civil wars and prevent the growing rate of terrorism, the international community is using different methods including peace building as a means of solution [25].

The collapse of Somalia as a state in 1991 triggered looting, lawlessness and subsequent massive exodus of Somalis into the Diaspora. External actors and humanitarian assistants who responded to Somalia crisis faced challenges in executing their core mandate and suffered heavy casualties in the hands of militias. According to [23], this marked the beginning of Somalia's socio-political, security and economic isolation.

A growing problem has been identification of appropriate peace building mechanisms in Somalia. External actors eager to resolve the conflicts are not seen as neutral inside Somalia, or have a history there which renders them suspect in the eyes of some Somalis. The UN itself has a controversial and difficult history in the country ranging to the blame of misdiagnosis, poor methodology and delayed interventions in 1993 eroding its potential to broker peace talks. The Somali crisis has increasingly reflected a divide between factions backed by Ethiopia and Kenya versus those enjoying backing in the Arab world. Neither the African Union nor the League of Arab States are viewed as neutral on Somalia affairs [26].

The IGAD is divided and viewed by Somalis as currently dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya who have competing agendas in Somalia state building processes. Previous attempts to revamp peace building in Somalia were frustrated by a range of clan politics that included the issue of representations, agenda for peace considerations, external interests, inter-clan conflict memories, disputed peace meeting venues and the existence of peace spoilers. In view of these, [6] contends that most of the peace building convened were privileged for brokering power sharing agreement for a transitional central government over actual conflict resolution. At their worst, some of the agreements signed degenerated into crude cake-cutting exercises in which the agenda was reduced to allocation of cabinet positions by clan faction.

The contradicting policy reports and recommendations regarding the Somalia conflicts made by different scholars have further aggravated the situation for finding peace in Somalia. For example, [23] is of the view that the protracted Somalia conflict is as a result of the regional conflicting interests and other unresolved intra and interstate conflicts. Other scholars argued that Somalia lacks a reliable external actor in settling her disputes while others like [15] contend that the Somalia strategic position economically is the main factor for external interest. In spite of the varied interventions through external actor involvement, peace in Somalia has proven elusive. This study therefore attempts to investigate and explore this situation.

1.3 Objectives of the study :

The general objective of the study was to evaluate the external actor involvement including state and non-state actors influencing peace building processes in Somalia.

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i Explore the nature of external actor involvement in Somalia Peace building processes.
- ii Assess the role of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes
- iii Examine the challenges facing external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes.

1.4 Research Questions :

The research was guided by the following questions derived from the specific objectives:

- i. What were the nature of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?
- ii. What were the roles of external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?
- iii. What were the challenges faced by the external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes?

1.5 Justification of the study :

The external actor involvement responding to Somalia crisis in 1991 lacked a coherent approach in dealing with the Somalia conflicts. The international relief and security operation that followed Somalia state collapse brought help to needy population, but failed in addressing genuine peace building processes. At their best, the external actor involvement presided over power sharing by warring clans than addressing the root causes of conflicts. For over two decades now, the country has been without a functioning government capable of restoring stability and winning international confidence. According to [27] Somalia is still considered as a failed state, most corrupt and insecure. This study will add value in filling this academic gap which posits that the state is the most powerful organization in all countries, even when it is not effective in implementing policy and provision of law and order, hence must be safeguarded by all means which include external and internal means.

At the policy level, this study will help inform the governments and states on the value of focusing on external peace initiatives and peace building strategies for national stability. It will prove useful to international conflict managers not only in the African region but to other parts of the world where post conflict peace initiatives and peace building services are required thus expected to influence policy formulation in critical meetings and conflict situation reviews for Somalia at major diplomatic summits and extra-ordinary meetings hitherto frequently called to consider the protracted conflicts in Somalia by the IGAD, AU and the UN.

1.6 Scope of the study :

The study focused on the strategies for peace building by addressing unique external actor such as state and non-state actors in conflicts and subsequent peace building. The study sought to investigate the validity and constraints of existing peace building processes and how they impacted on the overall peace by conducting an explanatory research inquiry. The study covers a period from 1993 when the first external humanitarian and peace building initiative was launched by the UN in Somalia following the collapsed state. Somalia has experienced one of the longest civil wars attributed to the collapse of the state in 1991 which resulted into the destruction of social fabrics and institutions necessary for governance making Somalia the most insecure and chaotic country in the world. In spite of its homogeneity of using the same language and adhering to the same religion, Somalia has remained an area with widespread lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and human rights abuses topping the list of failed states index in the world. The study investigated the external actor involvement influencing peace building processes in Somalia. It explored to find out whether external actor involvement in peace building have been successful or not and the challenges facing it. The study was conducted from January to June, 2016 in the Southern parts of Somalia- Gedo region that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia.

The external actors in the Somali conflict since the collapse of the country's central government in 1991 are many. This study did not cover in details all the external actors' involvement in Somalia peace building processes as pronounced in the background to the study. Instead the study mainly focused on the interest and issues of two of Somali's immediate neighbouring states namely Ethiopia and Kenya, UN, AU (AMISOM) and IGAD that are actively involved in Somalia conflicts in response to the overall research questions.

2. METHODOLOGY

The physical location is on the African continent and specifically the Horn of African region. Somalia is situated on the Eastern parts of Horn of Africa and lies between 08° - 11° parallel North of the equator and 42° - 49° Meridian East of the Greenwich. The territorial sovereignty of Somalia extends to the land, island, sea, sub-soil, air space and the continental shelf. Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa with borders to Ethiopia in the west, to Kenya in the south-west and to the Republic of Djibouti in the north-west. The Equator passes through the southern tip of the country. The study was

conducted in the Southern parts of Somalia with emphasis to Gedo an administrative region that borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. The study was conducted in six Districts occupied by the major Somalia clans that included; Dolo, Belet-Hawa, Luuq, El Wak, Garbaharey, and Bardera. The region is occupied by major clans: Marehan, Sheikhah in Luuq; Garre in El Wak; Asharaf and Gabaweyn in Dolo/Luuq; and Ajuran, Auliyahan, Jareer and Rahanweyn sub-clans in Bardera

According to the [29] Somalia has an estimated universal population of 9 million people and the Gedo region has an estimated population of 328,378 persons. The study targeted 425 respondents from the following categories- UN, AU, AMISOM, IGAD, NGOs, CBOs, ENDF, KDF, SNA, Diplomatic Missions, Religious leaders, Farmers and Business community

Sample selection was determined according to [28] who recommends that 30% of population is representative in a research study. The following sample size was thus obtained using the conversion table as illustrated by [28]. The following population sample was determined as summarized and presented in the table.

TABLE I

S/No	POPULATION CATEGORY	SAMPLE SIZE
1	United Nation Table 3: Sample Size of the study s (UN)	24
2	African Union (AU)	24
3	AMISOM	24
4	IGAD	24
5	International/ Foreign NGOs	24
6	Local/Internal CBOs	24
7	Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF)	24
8	Kenya Defense Force (KDF)	24
9	Somalia National Army (SNA)	24
10	Diplomatic Missions	44
11	Religious Leaders	44
12	Farmers	44
13	Business Community	44
		TOTAL 392

Source: Field Data, 2016

Qualitative and quantitative methods were used in analysis and data presentation. They are qualitative in the sense that data collection and analysis were in the form of statements. Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 21 and Microsoft Excel were used to analyze the quantitative data. Frequency tables, graphs were used to present findings.

Limited by prohibitive cost of travelling, general suspicion and timing of the study which corresponded with the repatriation orders issued by Government of Kenya for the Somalia refugees in the Dadaab Camp. Other limitations experienced during the study included interviewing officials who were reluctant to discuss the limited government institutions, capacity and territorial reach of the Somalia Federal Government. Some participants were reluctant to share their identification for fear of reprisals from Al-Shabaab. Other participants avoided criticizing Al-Shabaab, particularly in focus group discussions, for fear of reprisals. While other participants were concerned that the study was an intelligence gathering mission for foreign agencies.

3. FINDINGS

3.1 Role of International Community in Somalia peace building :

Somalia remains an area where volatile and insecure conditions continue to motivate interventions. External actors in the Somali conflict and peace building processes include the frontline states, sub-regional, regional and international community who support and facilitate humanitarian and peace building processes. During the civil war that followed the ouster of the Siad Bare regime in 1991, hundreds of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies and other regional organizations came to Somalia to help the victims of the war and provide assistance to thousands of displaced people who were in desperate need of food, medicine and water. These international bodies needed local partners to help them with the distribution of humanitarian aid and arrange local security and logistics. In this context, hundreds of civil society organizations (CSOs) were formed to meet the

increased demand for local partners. Findings revealed that many of these organizations withered away due to insecurity, but some remained and are still functioning. In addition to the emerging private sector, a range of entities of the civil society at large, elders, Islamic courts, business groups, women associations, local NGOs have emerged in Somalia to play a variety of roles in defining community priorities and making resource allocation decisions aimed at peace building as discussed in the next sub heading on the role International Community actors.

The downfall of President Siad Bare in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem. The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance [1]

The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area [2]. Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Bare, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [2].

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the then Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict [3]. On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he asked then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to visit the area. In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, he led a team of senior United Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a ceasefire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation [2]. The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a ceasefire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict [2]

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the ceasefire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a ceasefire agreement. The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited [3].

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992), supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the ceasefire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance. On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia [3].

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in that country. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative on 28 April 1992 and left for the area on 1 May. In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, the ceasefire in the capital was to be monitored by a group of 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the agreements were to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs. In its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu in this regard. On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment of the unarmed observers [3].

The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for the purpose. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992. Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programs and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective ceasefire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation [3].

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia. Following the technical team's visit to Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Noting that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport. Given the difficulties, the Secretary-General concluded that the airlift operations

already being carried out by the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as by ICRC C needed to be enhanced substantially, with priority given to central and southern Somalia. In addition, a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somali border was established for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements. The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia [2].

There were six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs were working in Somalia as "implementing partners" of the United Nations. Moreover, ICRC continued to provide assistance under the most difficult of situations. There were also many local NGOs that worked with the United Nations and the international NGOs. Between 10 and 12 September 1992, as part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Ellison, led a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-Day Action Program for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992. The 100-Day Program was reviewed at the First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia [2].

The Program sought to highlight priority actions which were needed to prevent famine and the unacceptably high levels of death and deprivation in Somalia. The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country needing priority attention. The Program also identified the additional resources required to meet its eight main objectives: massive infusion of food aid; aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding; provision of basic health services and mass measles immunization campaign; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene; provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes; simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations; prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programs; building institutions and civil society rehabilitation and recovery. Donor response to the Program was generally prompt and generous. Of the \$82.7 million requested for the implementation of the Program, \$67.3 million was received [1].

From 1992, the Secretary-General convened the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, at the Conference Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Meeting was attended by representatives of donor countries and other Governments, Somali political and community leaders, and Somali NGOs, as well as regional and sub-regional organizations, United Nations agencies and international NGOs. The Meeting provided an opportunity to review the progress achieved in the implementation of the 100-Day Action Program, the obstacles encountered and the work that remained to be done. The discussion also went beyond the scope of the Action Program to address further relief activities, as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that the 100-Day Program should be followed by a new plan for 1993. Subsequently, it was decided that a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia would be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Program for 1993 and receive pledges from donors [1].

In 1992, despite all efforts by the international community, the United Nations Secretary-General and his new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Ismat Kittani, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. [The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Kittani (Iraq) as his Special Representative on 3 November 1992, to replace Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun who had resigned.] Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions, some torn by internal divisions were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general lawlessness compounded the situation [2].

Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms

taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger. The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed [3].

In a letter to the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. The Secretary-General stated that he did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort there. He cited the lack of government in Somalia, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies. The members of the Council discussed the Secretary-General's letter during informal consultations on 25 November. They expressed the view that the situation in Somalia was intolerable and asked the Secretary-General to present specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the situation [3].

In response, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further letter, dated 29 November, in which he outlined, for the Council's consideration, five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving people of Somalia. The Secretary-General also informed the Council of a visit he received on 25 November from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, then Acting Secretary of State of the United States, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate. According to the Secretary-General's letter, the first option would be to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate. The second option suggested that the idea of using international military personnel to protect relief activities be abandoned, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with the various faction and clan leaders. However, the Secretary-General considered neither of these two options to be an adequate response to the crisis [3].



Plate1: Foreign Military in Somalia.

Source : UNDP (2012)



Plate 2: Military-Civilian Actor Relationship in Somalia context.

Source : AMISOM

Findings revealed that primary role of the military component in peace building operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. The secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. In the Somalia context, the military component, over and above its security function, provided transport, medical services, camp building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services. The use of military assets in the peace building context differ from the use of military assets in the humanitarian context in that there is no assumption of independence, based on the neutrality and impartiality of the civilian peace-building partners. In the UN peace building context, both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation. The close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the UN peace building context does thus not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context.

Further, findings revealed that these kinds of military actions in support of the community should be distinguished from humanitarian assistance. The primary motive of the military unit for providing the medical service is to build a good relationship with the local population, to improve the image of their unit and the peace operation, and to build confidence in the peace process. In situations where a peace operation is dealing with elements hostile to its presence, a good relationship with the local community is essential for obtaining information from the local population and to minimize the risk of hostile acts carried out with the protection of the local population. The medical services provided by UN military units are not necessarily lifesaving, although in some individual cases they may be. The medical services are more akin to those being provided by a local clinic and in some cases it may be quite specialized, for instance, cataract operations and dental services.

At the regional level, AMISOM is supporting the Somalia governmental structures by implementing a national security plan, training of the Somali security forces, and assists in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, development and creation of federal administrative states. As to the other three options, the Secretary-General stated that their purpose would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end. The first of those three options would be for UNOSOM troops to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu in an attempt to discourage those abusing the relief efforts. However, the Secretary-General contended that a countrywide operation would be required to have the desired deterrent effect. The next option would entail a countrywide action by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council.

The Secretary-General mentioned in this connection the offer by the United States to organize and lead such an operation as shown in plate 1: 2007, the UNSC authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months. The Americans were on the frontline to ensure the UN mandate execution was abided by. On 3 December 1992, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Member States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind, and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions could be appropriately channeled to the States or operations concerned [4]. The Security Council requested the Secretary-General and Member States contributing troops to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces, and invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff of UNOSOM to the field headquarters of the unified command. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the States concerned to report regularly to it on the progress in establishing a secure environment in Somalia. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command [4].

In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

As to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the Security Council decided that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August, should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground. The first

elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces expanded their operations to major relief centers in Somalia. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Good coordination on the ground and at United Nations Headquarters was established between UNITAF and the United Nations. UNOSOM remained in the capital, and continued to liaise with UNITAF and plan for the transition to normal peacekeeping functions. On 19 December, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report in which he described actions taken to implement resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the transition from UNITAF to continued peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council defer its decision on such a transition until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goal. He suggested that it should await the establishment of a ceasefire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force [5].

In his further report to the Council, dated 26 January 1993, the Secretary-General congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. As to UNOSOM, he indicated that its major preoccupation at that juncture was the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning exercise, the Secretary-General pointed out, was proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF [5].

The UN Secretary-General convened an informal preparatory meeting at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, for a national reconciliation conference envisaged under United Nations auspices. A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the ceasefire and on modalities of disarmament; and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation, as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The Somali parties requested the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and sub-regional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference [5].

In 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II (LINK). He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. He pointed out, however, that despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia and incidents of violence continued to occur. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern [5].

The Secretary-General concluded, therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so as to be able to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure [5].

The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support. In addition, the United States Government agreed in principle to provide a tactical quick reaction force in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II would also include civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. The Secretary-General suggested 1 May 1993 as the date of transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was subsequently decided that the transfer of the military command would take place on 4 May. On 5 March 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.) of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months, effective 9 March 1993. He was asked to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to continuing the tasks of "promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country" [5].

Earlier, the Secretary-General had appointed Lieutenant-General ÇevikBir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II. On 26 March, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 814 in 1993, by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM in accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations. It authorized the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM for an initial period through 31 October 1993. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. All States, in particular neighboring ones, were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733 in 1992 [5].

In other provisions of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. Such assistance should include economic relief and rehabilitation of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, mine-clearance and public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia [5].

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were suppliers of resources to Somalia. When the Somali Civil Wars began in 1993, the United Nations (UN) provided aid but was subjected to extreme violence. The UN established the International Somalia Contact Group as a leader to end the transition government through means of peace and reconciliation. The UN continued humanitarian and stabilization efforts through the establishment of the peace keepers' coalition, United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which ended in the Battle of Mogdishu [1].

Majority of respondents 60% (252) argued that during the colonial period, the desired resources Somalia were basic needs like water and livestock. After independence, the need for resources shifted to foreign aid, civil servants and government resources. The dispersing of and access to these resources was dependent upon the clan who was in power, which created inequity, injustice and marginalization due to rampant corruption. When the Abgal and the Habargidir clans gained control of the state, it ended in a dispute over power between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. The Habargidir clan also fought the Hawadle clan for control of Kismayo port and state farms in Qoryooley district. Control of Kismayo was violently pursued by the Absame and the Harti militias, as well as the Mareehaan and the Harti clans. When ousted, opposition leaders refuse to give up power and attempt to maintain control by force, which led to violence between the Majerteen sub-clans, the Isaaq clans, and the Digil and Mirifle clans. The civil violence in Somalia is sustained due to the struggles between clans and militias for control over key cities, ports or airports, checkpoints, resources, banknotes, foreign aid and technical [2].

In this regard, the study sought to assess the contribution of third party actors towards the broader external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes. In this regard, the respondents were asked in a closed and open ended question to rate and narrate the role played by the NGOs, CBOs and other legally internationally recognized organization affiliated to the UN. Responses and opinions of respondents is summarized in figure 1:




Fig. 1. Rating of International community performance in Somalia

Source: Field Data, 2016.

Opinion expressed in figure 11: indicate that the majority of respondents 55% (231) were of the opinion that the current degree of peace enjoyed in Somalia is attributed to the role of NGOs through the 2000 Arta Peace agreement that introduced interim government in Somalia and ushered the country back to the chart of international organization assembly of sovereign states (UN), while 45% (189) argued that the NGOs were being backed by state actors through the UN, EU and AU to advance their interest through informal means. Findings revealed that during the first two governments after independence, traditional and indigenous methods were put in practice to manage conflicts and govern the country. In every area of Somalia elders were an important part of the community. They were respected for their wisdom and the role that they played in society. However, the military Junta used its military power for governing and weakened the traditional elders influence. The failure of this policy spread quickly and the country was once again gripped by instability. Although many people thought the military had secured the country, they were unaware of the slight difference between peace and security.

Findings revealed that NGOs were established in the early 1990s, a period of rampant anarchy and lack of government. Thereafter they have been part of civil society organizations that played crucial roles in conflict resolution and in the process of pacification, deploying both modern and traditional methods. NGOs have been capable of digging wells or building schools in rural areas as well as share their counseling with the traditional elders in the area. This increases the sustainability of their products and services and prevents conflict.

One of the memorable peace building exercises that NGOs achieved was the 2000 Arta Somali Conflict resolution held in Djibouti, when Abdikassim Salat Hassan was elected transitional president by various clan leaders. Other crucial and sustainable peace building activity occurred in Northwest Somalia, influenced by several actors. This region, that declared itself as the independent country of Somaliland on 18 May 1991, blew up when different clans started to fight. The peace and administration that they have today were achieved through traditional mechanisms with elders locally known as Guurti, leading the process.

NGOs also played a crucial role in peace building in this region. Their actions included negotiation, facilitation, mediation, etc. For the sustainability of peace in Somaliland NGOs built strategies to increase the capacity of civil society organizations, including women's groups, elders, youth and students. In the Gedo region, where anarchy and conflict became part of life, NGOs used a strategy of inclusion of different social sectors. Some NGOs such as Somali Peace Line started peace developing workshops in schools and trained students and teachers in peace and conflict issues. Other organizations striving for the same goals include Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC), Reconciliation and Dialogue Center (RDC), Women's Development Organization (IIDA) and Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN). SOCCA's (Somali organization for Community Development Activities) role includes holding workshops on peace for students and youth in Mogadishu and Bosaso, advocacy and campaigning. All of them campaign to raise awareness of the importance of peace, as well as to eradicate poverty and inequality which are also the root causes of Somali conflict.

The findings further revealed that the United States led many humanitarian efforts in Somalia, which includes UNOSOM II, in addition to facilitating equipment distribution to AMISOM along with France. The United Kingdom (UK) is particularly interested in the Somali conflict and provides extensive development assistance due to its concern for the Somali people and the direct affects this conflict has on the UK. The Arab League promotes peace and is responsible for the provision of funding for the negotiation process. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) is currently responsible for security assurance in Somalia. There are many humanitarian aid organizations involved in the Somali crises, which include the Red Cross, Medicines sans Frontiers, CARE, CARITAS, OXFAM, Save the Children, in addition to fifty-two aiding or supporting NGOs. Findings revealed that International Maritime Organization and the World Food Program have been active in reporting and coordinating anti- piracy campaigns along the Somalia sea line.

Further the research revealed that Turkey is the newest country to intervene in Somalia as a secondary actor and its involvement has produced some positive results. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's courageous visit to Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine and his decision to open an embassy gave fresh impetus to efforts to establish lasting peace. Widespread Somali gratitude for Turkish humanitarian endeavors and the country's status as a Muslim and democratic state established Turkey as a welcome partner. Majority of respondents 65% (273) however, argued that turkeys contribution is well received as an external actor, relations regarding their operations will largely depend on other foreign powers on the ground. If the Somali people's high expectations are not moderated and if Ankara is unable to expand its relief and development aid to peaceful regions outside Mogadishu, the Turkey-Somalia partnership could be strained or quickly transformed into a relationship beset by resentment [6].

3.2 Role of regional actors :

Integration means two or more Nation State actors coming together to form a new center in the system of states [7]. The State of Somalia achieved its independence from Great Britain in June 26, 1960, by a Royal Proclamation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. On July 1, 1960, (Six days later) Somaliland and Somalia declared their union as the Somali Republic. Lewis (2004) reflects that the merger paved way for unification of Somalia under a single flag chosen at independence- a white five-pointed star over a blue shield. The five-pointed stars adopted in the flag represented all the 'five' regions occupied by Somali people in the Horn of Africa namely; Somaliland, Somalia, the French Somali Coast in Djibouti, the North Eastern regions of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

When Somalia became independent in 1960, the immediate political interest was the legitimacy of Somalis. Decision was muted to reclaim all the Somali inhabited areas in the neighboring countries under the Somali integration [8]. The presence of Somalis in neighboring countries stirred demands for unity of a Greater Somalia and the means to achieve this was either through war or cessation [9].

In 1964 fighting erupted with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, which Somalia claimed. Kenya became involved in the conflict due to similar claims over the North Eastern region of Kenya. The inhabitants of French Somaliland (Djibouti) meanwhile, voted to continue their association with France. The first nine years of her independence, Somalia was governed under a parliamentary system with up to 60 parties at some point, but characterized by political coalitions, occasional violence and assassinations of public and political figures [10].

The territorial claims of the Somalia were viewed by most African leaders as a very dangerous expansionist adventure and contravention of the principle of the territorial integrity and brought Somalia into diplomatic isolation, Mohamed [11]. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in May, 1963 Somalia President Adan Abdulla Osman's speech advocating for the swift amalgamation of the Greater Somalia was poorly received as remarked by one respondent in the FGDs:

His argument that the territorial integrity represented an out moded concepts whose roots were embedded in colonialism and as such was not necessarily useful or in the best interest of post-colonial states fell on deaf ears. All the thirty African Governments and Heads of States signed the OAU charter, which recognized the sanctity of Africa's colonial borders. This was the beginning of Somali as a country being considered as irrelevant in the African region.....

Regional groupings of small Nation states cluster around a local great power and pool military, economic and other resources in peace and war. That such an arrangement foster inter-dependence and the need to integrate resources as well as promote regional security [12]. The European Union (EU) started with six Nation states who founded the European

Coal and Steel community as proposed by Robert Schuman in his declaration on 9th may 1950. Today the EU has twenty seven member states [7]. Conditions for joining the EU include economic and political conditions called the “Copenhagen Criteria” that were as a result of Copenhagen Summit in June 1993. These include: stable Democracy, Rule of law, Human rights, Freedoms and Democratic governance institutions as enshrined in article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty [7]. Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa is spearheaded by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development is a regional organization of seven African countries in the Horn of Africa tasked with the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. The organization comprises of Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea a founder member was suspended in 2007 [13]. The goal of IGAD is to spearhead peace, development and regional integration in the Horn of Africa. IGAD also aims to complement the efforts of Member States to achieve increased cooperation, promotion, maintenance of Peace and security and humanitarian affairs among others [14]. In Africa, the African Union is working with regional organizations to secure peace in Africa. However there are concerns of multiple economic membership hindering effective and sustainable interventions.

3.3 Frontline States Actor Involvement :

Somalia does not have a formal constitution but it enjoys a constitutional tradition dating back to 1961, when the newly independent republic adopted its first constitution by referendum. Representatives of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and various political factions signed a transitional federal charter on September 15, 2003 in Nairobi, Kenya. The acceptance of the charter represented the completion of one of the goals of the TNG’s three-year mandate. Pending the charter’s implementation, the TNG, created by a peace conference in Djibouti in 2000, operated under an interim constitution that replaced the constitution of 1979, amended in 1990, which had provided for a presidential system under which the president served as both the head of state and the head of government. The study sought to assess the contribution of secondary actors towards the broader external actor involvement in Somalia peace building processes. In this regard, the respondents were asked in a closed and open ended question to rate and narrate the role played by the immediate neighboring countries particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, IGAD, AU, AMISOM and the UN. Responses and opinions of respondents is summarized in figure 2.




Figure. 2. Evaluation of Kenya and Ethiopia involvement in Somalia peace

Source: Field Data, 2016.

Opinion of respondents on the rating of frontline state actor involvement was 50: 50. However, there have been a number of other actors not necessarily bordering Somalia that have contributed to the exacerbation of the Somali conflict and peace building initiatives. Some respondents argued that some countries such as Egypt, Iran and Yemen provided support to UIC, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) or Al-Shabaab, and Eritrea provided soldiers to the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts to destabilize Somalia.

The findings is in agreement with [15] that Ethiopia has participated in many activities that have blocked peace-building efforts in Somalia in order to maintain a weak and divided Somalia Ethiopia has supported Somali warlords, provided

shelter and arms to individuals and groups, undermined the Cairo Accord 1997 and Arta Agreement 2000 Peace accords, manipulated the Somali peace process in Kenya, manipulated the transitional government, supplied weapons and occupied areas in southern Somalia. A third party (NGOs) through the UN monitoring group namely UNDP(2012) reported arms supporters, which includes Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria [16]. Pakistan and Malaysia have played roles in oppressing new Somali leaders. The findings also revealed that the African Union peace keepers ultimately ousted the rival ICU as posits [13].

The researcher disregarded opinion of other countries other than Kenya and Ethiopia. In this regard, the study only considered opinions reflecting Kenya and Ethiopia. One respondent interviewed in Kenya from among the targeted respondent reflected that:

On Thursday Morning on April 2, 2015, Kenya woke up to news of the most heinous attack and slaughter of 147 Kenyans at Garissa University College. It was the cruelest terrorist attack on Kenya since the 1998 US Embassy bombing. Prior to Garissa, there had been Westgate, Mpeketoni, and Mandera. And yet terrorism is a global threat requiring robust international partnerships. We are aware of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in West Africa, and Al Qaeda globally. For us here in Kenya though, while we know that terrorism is a global problem, we appreciate that the arena of terrorism is right at our backyard in Somalia. In order to fight it therefore, Kenya will continue the difficult and daunting task of identifying, separating, tracking and deterring the enemy not only in Kenya but in Somalia. We continue to do this alongside our African and international allies in all spheres of life including political leadership, all levels of government, in civil society and in the private sector.

It is Kenya's strong desire to have a peaceful, stable and prosperous Somalia. More than any other country, Kenya stands to reap the benefit of such a desirable end state. This vision is what has driven and continues to drive Kenya's engagement with the situation in Somalia. Kenya has a responsibility of protecting the Sovereignty of her people and the Integrity of the territory which defines Kenya [17].

The facts about the nature of conflict in Somalia are often misrepresented leading to an acute misunderstanding of the problem, counterproductive interventions and often times undue criticism. This has in turn led to misleading diagnosis of the conflict. The study therefore sought to investigate the role of Kenya in Somalia peace building processes. In this regard an open ended question was asked to key informant. The responses obtained from key informants are presented verbatim as;

"We must never forget that for over 20 years, Somalia was classified as a failed state. This means that all the key characteristics of a state were missing and any talk of stabilization of the Somalia demands that all these elements of statehood are restored. The task cannot be achieved instantaneously. It takes time. The period between 1991 when the Government of Somalia formally collapsed and 2004 when the Transitional Government was established here in Nairobi has been a subject of intense academic debate I will not dwell into that period, other than to remind this gathering that there were a total of 11 attempts to restore statehood in Somalia. As some analysts have described it, the period maybe characterised as a period of "missed opportunities." Let me begin from the period after 2004. After the TFG was established in 2004, the international community, including some of us within the region was very pessimistic about the future of peace in Somalia. This pessimism grew when the transitional government of Somalia remained holed up in Baidoa, since February 26, 2006, in what was supposed to be a temporary home soon after relocating from Nairobi where it had been operating since its inauguration in 2004. In other words, the Transitional Government was failing to provide the most basic of services in form of security, even to itself and its institutions. In an effort to support the Transitional Government to reverse the deteriorating security situation in Somalia, IGAD proposed and sought authorization from the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) which was intended for immediate implementation in March 2006. However, although its deployment was approved by the UN Security Council on December 6, 2006, IGASOM's full deployment was never achieved leading to IGAD to request the AU to take over the force and subsequently the Peace and Security Council approved the conversion of IGASOM to AMISOM in September 14, 2006. Many reasons are given to explain the inability of the region to fully deploy IGASOM. Many of these reasons are those advanced by the pessimists. However, fundamental to this situation was that it denied Somalia's immediate neighbours (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) from contributing troops to the force, a situation which led to impatience within the region and global complacency. With the

impatience of the neighbours growing, global complacency heightened. The decision by Somalia's immediate neighbours to get directly involved in the deployment of AMISOM, was a game changer in turning around the security situation in Somalia and thereby creating an enabling environment for the transition in Somalia to take place. By 2011, the security situation in Somalia had deteriorated with growing clashes between pro-government forces and radical Islamists claiming hundreds of lives each day. A year earlier, the de-facto Islamist opposition leader in Somalia, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys had returned from exile in Eritrea to Somalia vowing to fight the TFG troops and AMISOM. The government was consistently losing control of towns after towns and Al-Shabaab was closing in on Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia's Transitional Government was facing logistical, operational and leadership challenges. By May 2010, AMISOM remained far below the anticipated 8000-troop strong force with only about 4,213 troops comprising of 1,823 Ugandan and 2,390 Burundian troops stationed in Mogadishu. This is in spite of being in place for over four years and its mandate having been expanded by UNSC Resolution 1772 (2007) to include provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter. Countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana had pledged to contribute troops to this force and yet none was forthcoming. Dramatic events that eventually altered the course of events took place in Kenya during early October 2011. On October 13, 2011, militants suspected to be Al Shabaab gunmen crossed into a refugee camp near the Kenya-Somalia border and abducted two European aid workers. That was the fourth time within five weeks that the group had successfully carried out similar attacks in Kenya. Prior to September 2011, incidences such as these had never succeeded in Kenyan soil in spite of the 22 years anarchy in Somalia. The government of Kenya could no longer take such attacks lightly. On October 16, 2011, launched 'operation linda nchi', by deploying its forces into Somalia with a single objective of preventing and curtaining further attacks on Kenyan interests being launched out of Somalia. A couple of weeks following KDF's entry into Somalia, the African Union formally requested the Government of Kenya to offer its forces totalling over 4,000 to be integrated in to AMISOM. Kenya accepted this call in early 2012. Many pundits will agree that the security situation has dramatically changed in Somalia. Let me now turn my responses to the second question of statehood and territorial integrity. The government must be viewed as legitimate by the subjects of that country. As the transition period drew to a speedy end in November 2011, the greatest threat facing Somalia at that time was the risk of complete disintegration due to the rapidly dissipating legitimacy of the Transitional Government, occasioned by the never ending conflict among the political leaders of that country. The problem was compounded by a crippled, poorly funded AMISOM. A robust strategy that would significantly reduce the threat inherent in the apparent dissipating legitimacy of the Transitional Government and reverse global complacency therefore had to be evolved. The strategy, Kenya reckoned, would also be one that would aid the neighbours to transform their impatience into proactive action that would in turn influence the outcomes of the transition in such a way as to confer legitimacy to the emerging Government in Somalia. Through intense engagement with the region, continent and with global partners, it was generally agreed that the transition in Somalia would be expected to be internally grown within Somalia, must confer legitimacy to the emerging institutions and must be broad-based and inclusive. In this regard, Kenya sought to convince continental and international players that whatever the conclusion of the debate, the Somalis themselves must own whatever meaning was attached to the transition. In a sense, we reckoned that the transition in Somalia would be compared to the 1994 transition election in South Africa which, although largely fell short of the conventional democratic elections internationally, it is still hailed as the foundation for the South African democracy today. This was so because the South African transition was internally determined and agreed upon. Kenya therefore would champion efforts that went towards assisting the Somalis to do just that. In equal measure, Kenya would guard against and object to any negative views with the potential to derail the Somali transition. By ensuring that the transition was internally managed, the process conferred legitimacy and transparency to the emerging government/administration. The transition also redefined Somalia in broader terms as opposed to the "Mogadishu-centric" definition of that country. The Mogadishu-centric Transitional Government was unable to extend its sphere of influence beyond Mogadishu. It would indeed be argued that it was the inability of a Mogadishu-centric government that facilitated the Al-shabaab to entrench itself in other parts of Somalia in particular the central, southern and western parts of that country. The transition therefore would have to be one that would respect and solidify gains that the decentralised regions such as Puntland and Somaliland had built over the previous two decades. It would also have to seek to establish such decentralised administrations in places where they did not exist. As we gather here today, these Administrations have been set up and are now beginning to exert their authority in areas where, for decades, Al-Shabaab and other Islamic fundamentalist groups ruled.

To provide deep insight on Kenya's role in Somalia peace building, the respondent from Somalia were asked through open and closed ended questions on the effectiveness of peace reconciliation meetings held in Kenya during the transition period. Their responses are summarized in figure 3..




Fig. 3. Impact of Externally organized National peace for Somalia

Source: Field data, (2016)

As indicated in figure 14 above, 50.2% of the respondents rated Kenya's as fair compared to other external actors. Respondents were of the view that Peace can only come where the values of unity and its importance are known and where harmony, respect and Wellbeing are the critical points to be raised while 6.1% of the respondents preferred "Xeer" traditional Somali peace initiative as an effective tool for peace building process in Somalia and disregarded the impact of National reconciliations exercises and particularly the ones held out of Mogadishu. Similarly, on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is totally agree and 5 is totally disagree, respondents were asked to rate the following statements regarding the outcome of peace buildings in Somalia. The Focus Group Discussions rated the outcome of peace initiatives is presented in Table II;

TABLE II. Assessment of Externally organized peace building

Overall peace meetings during the transition period in Somalia were:	1	2	3	4	5
Convened by foreigners					✓
Held in Mogadishu					✓
Represented by all major clans	✓				
Called to end clan rivalry	✓				
Organized for relief food distribution					✓
Attended by women leaders					✓
Attended by traditional elders					✓
Attended by youth groups					✓
Attended by the Diaspora					✓

Source: Field data, (2016)

80% of respondents indicated that overall peace meetings during the transition period in Somalia were represented by all major clans and were called to end clan rivalry in Somalia. 20% disagreed. During the first Somali Peace and Reconciliation conference in 2002, only men were recognized as official delegates. This was because only representatives of Somalia's five clans were allowed as official representatives-and traditionally only men represent the clan. One member of the FGDs remarked that:

the small cross-clan group of women Asha Haji Elmi led to the talks was denied a platform as they were not official clan representatives. The women responded by demanding a place in the negotiations as representatives of Somalia's sixth

clan-the clan of women. One respondent alluded that the sixth clan was officially recognized, and the women were able to get a quota in the final resolution for women in government. Today, for the first time in Somali history, there are women in Parliament. The women have managed to reopen some of the no-go streets in parts of Mogadishu. In the past walking or driving down such streets meant risking death at the hands of snipers or a war lord's patrols. Now there is safe access to Bender Hospital, the main pediatrics hospital. Closed for eight years, the hospital is again open. Give Peace a Chance campaign, which uses "the extensive women's networks to encourage communities to support the top-down peace initiatives" of the transitional government.

Somali women have been the principle victims of the political conflicts in the country since 1991. However the traditional exclusion of women from the political and economic spheres has left women unprepared to assume their rightful roles in the reconciliation and development processes. Participation in the political and economic arenas are interdependent and the processes of reconciliation and development are complementary. 50% respondents interviewed confirmed that women lead complex lives. They juggle many identities and responsibilities. Women are often custodians of traditions which provide a strong identity and at the same time marginalize them and deny them a space in public life. Women's peacemaking reveals this complexity. Women's peacemaking also reveals more insights on what may be needed to bridge the divides created by armed conflict, and to heal the wounds such conflict creates. Activists in women's peace movements have broken new ground in developing strategies, organizations and tools for peace. Their work is often grounded in the pragmatic realities of daily life, realities which have the potential to lead to new definitions of peace. One respondents argued that:

Peace is therefore not possible in Somalia without the active involvement of women and girls. Any movement for peace cannot ignore women's roles in supporting conflict. In order to develop any model of how peace identities emerge, gender must be taken into account, and in particular the complexities and contradictions in women's lives. Likewise, any movement for peace cannot afford to ignore the energy, ideas and leadership women and girls bring to building peace.

This study is in agreements with the views expressed about inclusion of women in the Somalia building processes. Peace building and state building can be mutually reinforcing processes that establish and support effective, legitimate, accountable and responsive states; indeed, in practice, the state is the primary vehicle through which domestic and international peace is sought Sahnoun [18].

Regarding the Somalia conflict spillover effects to the frontline states, Kenya had a great impact on the Somalia conflicts because of the cross border cultural links. This increased banditry, proliferation of small arms and continuous hit and run battles affecting the whole of the northern region [7]. The end of the Shifta war did not improve the security or living conditions in Kenya as fast as expected due to the hostilities between the various Somalia clans found astride the common border. The flooding of the North Eastern region of Kenya with small arms led to their proliferation in all parts of Kenya. At a conference on the proliferation of small arms hosted by Kenya in March 2000, former president Moi, noted that the unchecked flow of the arms was destroying peace in the region [2]. Findings revealed that Somalia is a distinguished source of arms since early 1990s, and it is estimated that in one month about 5,000 automatic rifles are smuggled into Kenya. This has made Kenya a major transit point of weapons in the region. Refugees have also become a major source of insecurity as noted by a senior firearm-licensing official who was quoted as saying that fleeing fighters bring in all manner of arms. The increasing availability of weapons has led to the rising insecurity, especially in Nairobi, where guns are used for violent robberies. An analysis by the US State Department in 2001 quoted a Kenya's top firearms licensing official; "seventy five per cent of the country is awash with illicit arms" [16]. In the North Eastern Parts of Kenya, the presence of firearms is strongly felt; especially along the Kenya-Somalia border where guns are carried openly. These are used in acts of banditry, cattle rustling, and armed highway attacks. The scope, magnitude and lethality of the attacks by armed cattle rustlers has forced communities to arm themselves leading to spiral of violence in the process.

Regarding the spillover Effects of Somalia conflicts to Ethiopia, the magnitude of the expansionism of Somalia president Bare regime in search for Greater Somalia became apparent with the weakening of the Ethiopian regime after the overthrow of Haile Selassie as reflected by [2]. Bare saw an opportunity to expand his vision. However, this proved to be an expensive mistake with the changing role and support from the western world. His forces were defeated in the battlefield and this became the beginning to the end of Bare's regime. The statement by his government at the time echoed the disappointment of the failure to garner support from the foreign powers. Bare saw his defeat as being the work of the

super-powers. He claimed that the Soviet Union and US were acting in cohort. This also led to cracks appearing in his regime and his undisputed role as the head of the army was put into question [19]. The cost of the war, however, to the Ethiopian regime was heavy and the impact on the state machinery was to rebound later as the events unfolded.

The dynamics of state modernization and disputes over national borders had a great effect on the Ogaden province of Ethiopia. The war involved international support from Cuba, Soviet Union and United States and the super power rivalry was transferred to Ethiopia and Somalia where political, military and financial aid was offered in exchange for military bases and other resources. In southern Ethiopia, political instability and the aftermath of the Ogaden war created an opportunity for armed communities along the Ethiopia-Somalia border to continue organized cattle raids. This clearly shows how refugees and rival clans carried firearms to execute their rivals, spread banditry into Ethiopia. There was an increase in attacks within Ethiopian territory in 1993 by armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian Government, who were supported by and operated from Somalia. These attacks were in form of hit-and-run incidents by guerrillas and bandits armed with small arms and grenades. The attacks and counter attacks resulted into the killing of many civilians and had implications to Somalia peace building processes as Ethiopia is seen as partisan to conflicts in the country.

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter observed that post conflict peace building have been undertaken on the global front as a mechanism to restore order to societies which have just emerged from violent conflict and wars. The chapter summarized Post conflict societies in Somalia as characterized by presence of primary, secondary and third party actors.

The chapter credits third party among other actors for the degree of present peace experienced in Somalia and also acknowledges that they were established in Somalia in early 1991, a period of rampant anarchy and lack of challenging government structures which influenced the effectiveness of Primary and secondary actor involvements in Somalia peace building processes. Thereafter they have been part of civil society organization that played crucial roles in peace building in Somalia. In the process of pacification, the NGOs deployed both modern and traditional methods. One of the memorable peace building exercise that NGOs achieved in Somalia was the 2000 Arta Somali Conflict Resolution held in Djibouti.

The chapter also credits NGOs with the creation of independent Somalia States such as Jubaland and Somaliland in 1991s and training of local civil society groups on selected social sectors in Somalia including women groups, elders, youth, students and teachers as a way of peace advocacy, peace building and for the ultimate purposes of ensuring sustainable peace as the local CBOs were to keep the government on checks and balances watch. The NGOs campaigned to raise awareness of the importance of peace as well as to eradicate poverty and inequality which were the root causes of Somalia conflicts which posed challenges in the peace building processes, the subject of the next chapter.

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